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Background: The recent work on the modified H5N1 has stirred an intense debate on the risk associated with the
accidental release from biosafety laboratory of potential pandemic pathogens. Here, we assess the risk that the
accidental escape of a novel transmissible influenza strain would not be contained in the local community.
Methods: We develop here a detailed agent-based model that specifically considers laboratory workers and
their contacts in microsimulations of the epidemic onset. We consider the following non-pharmaceutical
interventions: isolation of the laboratory, laboratory workers’ household quarantine, contact tracing of cases and
subsequent household quarantine of identified secondary cases, and school and workplace closure both preventive
and reactive.
Results: Model simulations suggest that there is a non-negligible probability (5% to 15%), strongly dependent on
reproduction number and probability of developing clinical symptoms, that the escape event is not detected
at all. We find that the containment depends on the timely implementation of non-pharmaceutical interventions
and contact tracing and it may be effective (>90% probability per event) only for pathogens with moderate
transmissibility (reproductive number no larger than R0 = 1.5). Containment depends on population density and
structure as well, with a probability of giving rise to a global event that is three to five times lower in rural areas.
Conclusions: Results suggest that controllability of escape events is not guaranteed and, given the rapid increase
of biosafety laboratories worldwide, this poses a serious threat to human health. Our findings may be relevant to
policy makers when designing adequate preparedness plans and may have important implications for determining
the location of new biosafety laboratories worldwide.
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The risk associated with the accidental laboratory escape
of potential pandemic pathogens is under the magnifying
lens of research and policy making communities [1,2].
The recent debate on the genetic manipulation of highly
virulent influenza viruses [3,4] has made clear the neces-
sity for quantitative risk/benefit assessment before star-
ting research projects involving biosafety level (BSL) 3
and 4 agents. According to data collected in 2010 and
2011, the number of BSL 4 laboratories worldwide is 38
[5], mostly concentrated in the US (10) and Europe (14).* Correspondence: a.vespignani@neu.edu
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orThe official number of BSL 3 facilities worldwide is
unknown, since most laboratories where research on in-
fectious diseases is carried out and many hospital labora-
tories operate at safety level 3. Their number, however, is
of the order of several thousands: there were 1,362 in
the US alone in 2008 [6]. According to data collected in
2010, the number of US workers with approved access
to biological select agent and toxin (BSAT) was 10,639
[7]. From 2004 to 2010, 639 release reports were re-
ported to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), 11 of
them reporting laboratory-acquired infections that, how-
ever, did not result in fatalities or secondary transmis-
sion [7]. A list of recently reported laboratory-acquired
infections is available (see [8]). A rigorous risk assess-
ment is a scientific challenge per se [9-11]. Although the
estimates of the probability of accidental escape areLtd. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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[11]), the increased number of laboratories working
on BSL 3 and 4 agents gives rise to estimates projec-
ting an appreciable combined escape risk of potential
pandemic pathogens (PPP) in a 10-year window [11].
In addition, for PPP, the relatively small risk of re-
lease has to be weighted against the size of the popu-
lation that could be affected by such an event, the
risk of severe or fatal cases and the likelihood of con-
tainment before the event could escalate to global
proportions. Furthermore, the quantitative analysis of
the post-release scenario is complicated by the diffe-
rent social and environmental settings that apply to
the more than 1,500 BSL 3 and 4 laboratories around
the world [9].
Here, we perform a quantitative analysis of (accidental)
post-release scenarios from a BSL facility, focusing on
the likelihood of containment of the accidental release
event. Although BSL 4 agents, such as Ebola virus and
Marburg virus, are considered the most dangerous to
handle because of the often fatal outcome of the disease,
they are unlikely to generate global risk because of their
inefficient mechanism of person-to-person transmission
and other features of the natural history of the induced
diseases [12,13]. It is therefore understood that the
major threat of a pandemic escalation is provided by
modified influenza viruses [10], and for this reason we
focused our work on the accidental release of novel in-
fluenza strain in a densely populated area of Europe. We
used a highly detailed agent-based model that speci-
fically considers laboratory workers and their household
in order to test the detailed implementation of non-
pharmaceutical containment measures in the very early
stage of the release/outbreak scenario. The model al-
lowed analysis of the progression of the epidemic at the
level of single individual. We could therefore assess the
likelihood of containment as a function of a wide range
of interventions, and provide a discussion of different
geographical settings (for example, rural vs urban seed-
ing) by analyzing the effects of population density and
structure. Differently from methods employed to esti-
mate the probability of containing naturally emerging
pathogens at the source, here we assumed that epi-
demiological surveillance is presumably enhanced in
areas where BSL laboratories are located, thus increasing
the likelihood of quickly detecting symptomatic cases.
Moreover, we assumed that this makes it possible to put
in place intervention measures (for example, social
distancing measures and contact tracing) at the very be-
ginning of the epidemic. A number of factors determine
the controllability of an outbreak, including the uncer-
tainty in the efficacy of the containment policies re-
corded in the literature. For this reason we performed a
very extensive sensitivity analysis on the efficacy ofimplemented policies and the disease natural history. In
terms of specific interventions implemented, our analysis
is inspired by the experience of an accidental release of
severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in August
2003 from a laboratory in Singapore [14]: a total of 8
household contacts, 2 community contacts, 32 hospital
contacts, and 42 work contacts were identified, of whom
25 were placed under home quarantine. Both labora-
tories where the patient had worked were closed as a
precautionary measure. Specifically as regards contact
tracing, its efficacy for tuberculosis (TB) is ascertained
(large-scale studies tracing contacts of TB patients in the
US and Canada found high incidence rates of active TB
(200 to 2,200 cases per 100,000 individuals) against 5 to
10 per 100,000 in the general population [15-17]). In
contrast, contact tracing was performed in the case
(described above) of accidental release of SARS and in
another case of SARS [18] (1,000 persons traced), but no
secondary infections were detected. The two most cri-
tical quantities affecting the temporal pattern of spread
of influenza viruses, and containment probabilities as
well, are the generation time (the distribution of the
time interval between infection of a primary case and in-
fection of a secondary case caused by the primary case),
and the basic reproduction number R0. We analyzed
different scenarios by assuming transmissibility compar-
able to that observed in past influenza pandemics, for
example, the 2009 H1N1 virus (namely R0 or effective
transmissibility in the range 1.2 to 1.6 [19-24]) or 1918
Spanish influenza (R0 = 1.8 or higher [25]), and genera-
tion time distributions consistent with current estimates
for influenza (in the range 2.5 to 4 days [23,26-29]). Be-
yond these factors, intervention efficacy depends on
probability of developing clinical symptoms and length
of the incubation period, as they affect, respectively, the
probability of detecting cases and the probability of
stopping the transmission chain through rapid identifica-
tion of secondary cases. All these factors make influenza
different from other potential pandemic pathogens. For
instance, SARS is characterized by a very long incuba-
tion period (1 to 2 days for influenza, up to 10 days for
SARS [30]) and by a low proportion of infections ge-
nerated by asymptomatic infections (up to 50% for influ-
enza, negligible for SARS [30]). The R0 of SARS was
estimated to be slightly larger than that of influenza,
namely in the range 2 to 3 [30]. Smallpox, similar to
SARS, is another potentially pandemic pathogen charac-
terized by a low proportion of infections generated by
asymptomatic infections [30], though characterized by
a larger R0 (in the range of 5 to 10 [30]). In contrast,
Marburg hemorrhagic fever is characterized by a low
R0 (about 1.5 [12]) and short incubation period (about
2 days, with an overall generation time of 8 to
10 days [12]).
Figure 1 Doubling time. Average doubling time (dots) and 95% CI
(vertical lines) as a function of R0. For each value of R0 results were
obtained by analyzing 100 uncontrolled (no intervention)
simulated epidemics.
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In order to provide a quantitative assessment of the
containment likelihood and the detailed modeling of
interventions we used a stochastic microsimulation mo-
del structurally similar to the one used elsewhere (see
[19,31]) to generate simulations of pandemic events. The
model is a spatially explicit stochastic individual-based
model of influenza transmission with force of infection
decreasing with the distance and explicit transmission
in households, schools and workplaces (see Additional
file 1 for details). This model has been validated with
data from the H1N1 2009 pandemic [19] and compared
and tested against other large-scale computational approa-
ches [32]. The model integrates highly detailed data on
country-specific sociodemographic structures (for exam-
ple, household size and composition, age structure, rates
of school attendance, and so on) available from the Sta-
tistical Office of the European Commission [33]. These
data were used to generate highly detailed synthetic po-
pulations. More specifically, census data on frequencies of
household size and type, and age of household compo-
nents by size were used to group individuals into house-
holds. Data on rates of employment/inactivity and school
attendance by age, structure of educational systems,
school and workplace size allowed the assignment of indi-
viduals to schools and workplaces or their tagging as in-
active, according to their age. Following the available
estimates [34-37], the transmission model is paramete-
rized so that 18% of transmission occurs through contacts
made at school, 30% within households, 19% in work-
places and 33% in the general community. We made use
of state of the art estimates of generation time for influ-
enza viruses in the different settings [38], namely age
dependent Weibull distributions (see Additional file 1
for details on the natural history of the virus) with a
latent period of 1 day, consistent with estimates of
generation time in the range 2.5 to 4 days [23,26-29].
As it is nearly impossible to predict the reproduction
number R0 of a modified influenza strain (typical values
for past influenza pandemics are in the range 1.3 to 2
[23-26,39-44]) we analyzed scenarios with R0 varying
from 1.1 to 2.5, accounting for the possible larger
transmissibility of the modified virus with respect to
past influenza viruses. The resulting doubling time of
simulations without intervention is shown in Figure 1.
We considered containment successful if the disease
was eliminated in less than 5 months and resulted in
less than 1,000 cumulative cases. The rationale for
this choice is that, beyond the obvious requirement of
disease elimination, epidemics should be characterized
by a relatively low, socially acceptable, cumulative number
of cases in a relatively short period of time; otherwise
we speak of outbreak. See Additional file 1 for me-
thodological details.Once the initial conditions for the outbreak were set
the model generated stochastic ensemble estimates of
the unfolding of the epidemic. The infection transmis-
sion chain can be analyzed at the level of each single
individual and all the microscopic details of the progres-
sion of the epidemic in the population can be accessed
for each stochastic realization of the escape event. The
escape events were identically initialized in a BSL facility
in the Netherlands (see Figure 2), by assuming 1 initial
infected worker (among 50 to 150 workers; results ob-
tained by assuming a different number of initial in-
fections are analyzed in Additional file 1). This is a
fundamental difference of the proposed method with re-
spect to methods employed to estimate the probability
of containing naturally emerging pathogens at the source
or to analyze the potential effects of bioterrorist attacks:
we assume to exactly know the starting point of the out-
break. A second key difference from other studies is the
following: we assume that, if ascertained, initial in-
fections generated by the first infected laboratory worker
in the network of contacts comprising laboratory col-
leagues and laboratory workers’ household members
may generate an initial warning, and a set of medical/
epidemiological analyses are conducted very early to
identify the origin of reported symptoms.
We assumed the warning to be issued at the time Tw
corresponding to the first identification of one of the ini-
tial cases. Two key parameters determine the efficacy of
subsequent interventions: the first one is probability (Pc)
of identifying initial infections, which is related to the
virus specific probability of developing clinical symptoms
Figure 2 Study area. The map shows population density of the Netherlands (colors from yellow to dark brown indicate increasing densities,
from 1 to 3,500 inhabitants per km2), the location of the laboratory in a randomly chosen simulation (in Rotterdam, red point), the location of the
workers houses (blue points), the location of workplaces and schools attended by household members of laboratory workers (green). Black
concentric circles indicate distances of 10 km, 20 km, 30 km from the laboratory. The inset shows the probability of commuting to (at) a certain
distance by laboratory workers.
Table 1 Model parameters regulating efficacy of
interventions
Variable Description Reference (range)
Pc Infected close contacts
detection probability
0.6 (0.4 to 1)
Pg Infected random contacts
detection probability
Pc × 0.5 (0.1 to 1)
Pr Infected random contacts
self-reporting probability
Pg × 0.8 (0.5 to 1)
Ti Delay from initial warning
to intervention
3 (0 to 30) days
Tt Delay from case detection
to household quarantine
1 (0 to 4) days
Tp Duration of schools and
workplaces closure
21 (0, 7, 14, 21, 28) days
Dp Radius for schools and
workplaces closure
30 (0, 5, 10, 20, 30, 50, 50>) km
Fs Fraction of closed schools 0.9 (0 to 0.9)
Fw Fraction of closed workplaces 0 (0 to 0.5)
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cerned and report their health status. The second one is
the time (Ti) required to link the initial infections to an
accidental release of the modified influenza strain in the
laboratory (and not, for instance, to other circulating
seasonal influenza viruses) and to activate the contain-
ment interventions.
Once the PPP escape event has been detected we con-
sidered the following set of containment interventions:
(i) isolation of the laboratory, (ii) laboratory workers’
household quarantine, (iii) contact tracing of cases and
subsequent household quarantine of identified secondary
cases, (iv) school and workplace closure both preventive,
on a spatial basis, at the very beginning of the epidemic,
and reactive during the entire epidemic.
For contact tracing, we assumed that once one case is
detected, infected close contacts (that is household,
school and workplace contacts) of the case are detected
with probability Pc and can transmit the infection for a
certain time (Tt) before isolation and household quaran-
tine. Cases generated through random contacts in the
general population are detected with lower probability
(Pg). We also assume that undetected cases may self-
report their health status with a certain probability (Pr).
Parameters characterizing interventions along with re-
ference values and explored ranges are described in
Table 1 (see also Additional file 1 for model details). De-
tailed descriptions of the contact tracing procedure and
initial detection of the accidental release are shown in
Figure 3A,B respectively. In the following we explore dif-
ferent implementations of the containment interventions
and assess their effectiveness by generating stochastic
scenario output (SSO) sets, providing for each point in
space and time, as given by the resolution of the model,an ensemble of possible epidemic evolutions. We use as
a benchmark SSO set the no intervention case, in which
the epidemic is assumed to progress without external
intervention and a reference SSO set where all the above
containment measures are implemented according to
the reference value reported in Table 1.
Results and discussion
Below we discuss the likelihood that the escape of PPP
virus will spread into the local population and the ensu-
ing outbreak will be contained by non-pharmaceuticals
interventions that are likely the only ones to be available
in the early stage of the outbreak.
Figure 3 Contact tracing. (A) Probabilities of detecting first and second generation cases (the latter conditioned to the detection of first
generation cases) triggered by a traced index case. (B) Example of network of cases triggered by the initial infected laboratory worker
(undetected in this example; the initial warning is triggered by a secondary case in the laboratory), and probability of case detection at time of
intervention (Tw + Ti).
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In order to set a baseline for our investigation it is worth
stressing that there is a certain probability that the epi-
demic goes extinct without any intervention. In general,
it is very difficult to estimate this probability, as it de-
pends, beyond other factors, on seeding location (for ex-
ample, urban vs rural) and contact network of the initial
case. In our simulations, all these factors did not vary
much as we simulated the initial epidemic seeding to
occur always in a BSL facility in a populated area, thus
drastically reducing the uncertainty of estimates. The
probability of observing an epidemic outbreak in the ab-
sence of any interventions (no intervention scenario) isFigure 4 Reference scenario. (A) Probability of outbreak for different valu
epidemics) and reference scenario. (B) Probability of undetected epidemics
reference scenario with different values of Pc. (C) Upper panel: overall num
and R0 = 1.5 (not considering autoextinct epidemics). Middle panel: as upp
panel but for the number of isolated individuals (including the laboratory’s
each parameter set to produce the results shown.shown in Figure 4A, and it increases from about 25% for
R0 = 1.1 to values larger than 80% if R0 >2.
Proportion of undetected escape events
Notably, model simulations suggest that there is a non-
negligible probability that the escape event is not de-
tected at all. This may happen when no initial cases
are detected among laboratory workers and laboratory
workers’ household members, but secondary cases are
generated through random contacts in the general popula-
tion. In this case it is reasonable to assume that it is very
difficult to ascertain the accidental release of a PPP
from the BSL facility and to put in place timely controles of R0 by assuming no intervention scenario (uncontrolled
for different values of R0 by assuming reference scenario (in red) and
ber of cases in contained outbreaks by assuming reference scenario
er panel but for the number of traced cases. Lower panel: as upper
contact network). A total of 1,000 simulations were undertaken for
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detected epidemics increases with R0 and it is strongly in-
fluenced by the probability of detecting cases. If R0 >1.5, it
may be as high as 5% when Pc = 60% and 15% when
Pc = 40%. In general, the probability of case detection
affects the outcome of intervention options. As we note,
to a large extent the detection probability depends on the
rate of asymptomatic cases and non-detectable transmis-
sions. In the case of accidental release, the situation is
even worse because the probability of detecting cases
affects the probability of the timely implementation of
the control and containment interventions. As shown
in Additional file 1, this probability decreases and even-
tually vanishes when the number of initial cases is larger
than 1.
Controllability of the escape event
By assuming reference values for the parameters regula-
ting the containment plan, the probability of observing
an epidemic outbreak is drastically reduced for all values
of R0. In particular, containment is likely to succeed for
values of R0 below 1.5 (probability of outbreak less than
10%, see Figure 4A). The SSO set indicates that for those
values of R0 the probability of outbreak is largely due to
the probability of not detecting the outbreak itself; when
the accidental release of the PPP agent is detected in a
timely manner, outbreaks are contained with probability
close to 100%. The resources required to contain epi-
demic outbreaks with reference intervention may varyFigure 5 Epidemic timing. (A) Average number of daily cases as observe
lines represent minimum and maximum daily incidence. (B) As in (A) but f
for contained epidemics by assuming reference interventions. (E,F) As (A)
interventions. (G,H) As (A) and (B) but for undetected epidemics. A total oconsiderably. As shown in Figure 4C, most epidemics
are contained at the very beginning, when only few cases
are present in the population (median: three infections),
thus requiring little effort in terms of contact tracing
(median: two traced cases) and overall number of quar-
antined households. However, it is possible, though not
very likely, that containment requires the tracing of
several cases (up to 58 traced cases for R0 = 1.5, corre-
sponding to the isolation of about 500 individuals). Even
more demanding, especially from the social point of
view, is the closure of 90% of schools for 21 days in a ra-
dius of 30 km around location of initial cases, as as-
sumed by the reference SSO set. The number of cases
observed can be easily related to the fatality associated
to the outbreak if the case fatality rate (CFR) of the spe-
cific PPP agent is known. Unfortunately, the CFR is
often not obviously correlated with the transmissibility
of the pathogen. In addition, it is extremely difficult to
obtain reliable estimates of the CFR during the early
stage of an outbreak. A sensitivity analysis of the fatality
of the virus can however be performed by applying
plausible CFR to the number of cases observed with our
approach.
The timeline of simulated epidemics with R0 = 1.5 is
shown in Figure 5. Autoextinction occurs in very few
days (maximum 57 days) after only few cumulative cases
(maximum 10 to 20 cases). A similar pattern is observed
for contained epidemics, which may be characterized
by a slightly longer duration (maximum 100 days)d in autoextinct simulated epidemics (red points) with R0 = 1.5. Vertical
or the average cumulative number of cases. (C,D) As (A) and (B) but
and (B) but for uncontained epidemics by assuming reference
f 1,000 simulations were undertaken to produce the results shown.
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200). In both cases, incidence is always less than 20 daily
cases. Uncontained epidemics result in long-lasting epi-
demics (more than 1 year) and produce a large number of
cases in a short period of time (larger than 10,000 in
5 months; peak incidence between 10,000 and 15,000 daily
cases). Undetected epidemics are shorter (less than 1 year)
but are characterized by a much larger number of cases
(overall attack rate: 49.5% on average) and peak incidence
(between 200,000 and 300,000 daily cases). In addition,
these results show the mitigation efficacy of the proposed
interventions (specifically household quarantine and react-
ive school closure on the basis of contact tracing proce-
dures). Moreover, as only 2 different patterns may occur
(either the disease quickly dies out after a very limited
number of cases or it results in an epidemic outbreak,
with many cases in the very first days), these results justify
our definition of contained epidemic (disease elimination
in less than 5 months and less than 1,000 cumulative
cases), though many others are of course equivalent.
Sensitivity analysis of containment policies
Results are very sensitive to most of the parameters de-
scribing intervention options. By restricting our analysis
to parameters regulating contact tracing (thus excluding
self-reporting of cases and preventive closure of schools
and workplaces) we found that the probability of de-
tecting infections among close contacts of cases and
time from initial warning to interventions are the two
most critical variables (see Additional file 1 for details).
Figure 6A shows sensitivity of results obtained by assum-
ing reference parameters but varying the values of these
two parameters. For low values of R0 containment is very
likely to succeed when Pc is larger than 60% (for R0 = 1.2)Figure 6 Sensitivity analysis: contact tracing. (A) Probability (×100) of o
by varying Ti and Pc. (B) Probability of outbreak for different values of R0 b
scenarios with different delays in the isolation of traced cases. (C) Probabili
scenario, reference scenario, and reference scenarios with different probabi
simulations were undertaken for each parameter set to produce the resultsor 80% (for R0 = 1.5) even when the delay from initial
warning to interventions (Ti) is much larger than the one
assumed by reference simulations (up to 30 or 10 days for
R0 = 1.2 and 1.5 respectively). For larger values of R0, con-
tainment is feasible only when Pc is larger than 60% and
Ti is no larger than 3 to 5 days. Figure 6B,C show that
other parameters regulating contact tracing can play an
important role. In particular, Figure 6B shows that a timely
intervention during contact tracing is very critical and
Figure 6C shows that it may be important to identify a
high number of contacts infected in the general popula-
tion. This may be difficult in practice but it might be a
critical factor for the successful containment. If contact
tracing allows the identification of cases in the general
community with approximately the same probability of
identifying secondary cases in household, school and
workplaces, epidemic outbreaks with R0 up to 1.6 to
1.7 could be reasonably expected to be contained.
Effectiveness of preventive school and workplace closure
Figure 7B shows that closure of schools (with probability
90%) may be relevant while the additional closure of
workplaces (with probability 50%) may be relevant only
to decrease the outbreak probability when R0 is larger
than 1.4. Figure 7A shows that distance for spatial clos-
ure of places and duration of closure are irrelevant when
R0 is 1.2 (as the overall impact of the strategy is not very
relevant), while for values of R0 = 1.5 or larger, model
simulations show that, as expected, the longer the dur-
ation and the greater the distance are the lower the
probability of outbreak is: duration of 21 days and dis-
tance of 30 km represent a good compromise between
feasibility and impact. A distance of 30 km for spatially
targeted interventions is remarkably larger than thatutbreak for different values of R0 by assuming reference scenario and
y assuming no intervention scenario, reference scenario, and reference
ty of outbreak for different values of R0 by assuming no intervention
lities of identifying cases in the general community. A total of 1,000
shown.
Figure 7 Sensitivity analysis: school and workplace closure. (A) Probability (×100) of outbreak for different values of R0 by assuming
reference scenario with additional workplaces closure (Fw = 0.5) and by varying Dp and Tp. (B) Probability of outbreak for different values of R0 by
assuming no intervention scenario, reference scenario, and reference scenarios with different policies regulating school and workplaces closure. A
total of 1,000 simulations were undertaken for each parameter set to produce the results shown.
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Thailand. This can be explained by looking at the dif-
ferent human mobility patterns in Thailand, where
most of commuting is within 5 km, and the Netherlands,
where commutes of 10 to 30 km to go to work or school
are common [45] (see inset of Figure 2 and Additional
file 1 for details).Figure 8 Geographical variability. (A) Ratio between probability of outb
(The Netherlands) for different values of R0 by assuming reference scenario
different countries for different values of R0 by assuming reference scenario
Wales (UK, 80 km north of Cardiff), Uppland (SE, 100 km north of Uppsala),
(ES, 50 km northeast of Cordoba), Centre-Burgundy (France, 80 km southea
simulations carried out for Rotterdam (The Netherlands); comparative resul
rates in the different social contexts (that is the same probability of infectio
total of 1,000 simulations were undertaken for each parameter set to produGeographical context analysis
The probability of containing an epidemic outbreak may
also depend on the BSL laboratory location and the
sociodemographic structure of the population. This is
shown in Figure 8A where we compare results obtained
for Rotterdam (The Netherlands) with those obtained by
simulating the epidemic spread emerging from BSLreak in different urban areas and probability of outbreak in Rotterdam
. (B) Ratio between probability of outbreak in urban and rural areas in
. Urban areas as in (A); rural areas are low population density areas in
Sardinia island (IT, 50 km east of Sassari), Andalusia - Castile la Mancha
st of Orleans). Note that the reported value of R0 refers to that of
ts for other countries are obtained by assuming the same transmission
n transmission given a contact in a certain setting) as in Rotterdam. A
ce the results shown.
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Rotterdam likely represents the best case scenario among
those analyzed in this paper: for instance, the probability
of observing an epidemic outbreak in Paris, by assuming
reference interventions, may be 200% to 300% larger than
that estimated for the Netherlands if R0 <1.5. Differences
reduce drastically for larger values of R0. Without consi-
dering control measures, the probability of observing an
epidemic outbreak after virus escape is quite similar to
that in the Dutch scenario: slight differences can be ob-
served for low values of R0. Such large differences may be
due to dissimilarities in sociodemographic characteristics
of French and Dutch populations because, despite a
general similarity, some marked country-specific features
such as age structure and average household size exist.
However, although quantitatively different, the general
patterns obtained by varying Pc and Ti are the same
observed in the Dutch case. Detailed results for Paris are
discussed in Additional file 1. We also found that the
probability of observing an epidemic outbreak when the
BSL laboratory is located in a rural region is systematically
lower than that estimated for urban areas (see Figure 8B).
For instance, given a BSL facility located in the UK, we
found that the probability of epidemic outbreak when the
pathogen is accidentally released from a hypothetical BSL
laboratory in Wales (UK) may be three to five times lower
than that estimated for a BSL laboratory in London if
R0 <1.5. These differences are ascribable to differences
in population density and sociodemographic structure,
as discussed in [31]. These results are discussed in
detail in Additional file 1.
Impact of additional intervention
We found that results are not very sensitive to the prob-
ability of self-reporting (Pr) and to the initial set of inter-
ventions on the initial network of contacts comprising
laboratory workers and laboratory workers’ household
members. The reference scenario assumes the closure of
the laboratory and the quarantine of the households of
laboratory workers. We explored the possibility of ex-
tending these interventions and to preventively close all
workplaces and schools attended by relatives of labora-
tory workers. We found that closing the laboratory is
the only intervention leading to a certain reduction of
the outbreak probability. Additional interventions are of
little impact. We report on these findings in Additional
file 1.
Conclusions
Our results suggest that containment is likely to succeed
by employing social distancing measures only if R0 is no
larger than 1.5. Containment could be feasible even for
larger values of R0 in cases of very timely intervention
both in recognizing the accidental release and duringcontact tracing and high probability of detecting secon-
dary cases in the same household, school or workplace
as a newly identified case. Overall, these results suggest
that success in containing an accidentally released po-
tentially pandemic influenza virus by employing social
distancing measures only is uncertain: containment pro-
bability for a virus with transmissibility comparable to
many of the estimates for the 2009 H1N1 virus (namely
R0 or effective transmissibility in the range 1.2 to 1.6
[19-24]) is reassuring, even though containment is not
guaranteed. Should the transmissibility of the pathogen
be comparable to that of the 1918 Spanish influenza
(R0 = 1.8 or higher [25]), containment success would be
seriously compromised. A further relevant finding is the
strong impact of the BSL laboratory location. Rural areas
have a fivefold increase in containment probability with
respect to densely populated urban areas. Similarly, we
observe differences according to the sociodemographic
structure of the geographical region. These results pro-
vide data with potential use in defining policies for de-
ciding the most appropriate location of BSL laboratories.
Our simulations do not account for the possible use of
pharmaceutical interventions. While the availability of
an effective vaccine is highly questionable in case of
accidental release of genetically manipulated influenza
viruses from BSL facilities, the use of antivirals at the
very beginning of the epidemic is an option that could
be considered. If used for treatment of cases and pro-
phylaxis of close contacts (for example, household and
school contacts) only, however, the benefit should not be
very different from that obtained by assuming household
quarantine and reactive school closure, as this paper
does. Moreover, it requires a timely administration
(within 2 days from symptoms onset [25,46-50]) to be
effective. Geographical targeting of a large fraction of
the population is a completely different option that
could be considered: on the one hand it could lead to
drastically increasing the probability of containment
but on the other hand also poses serious logistical
challenges [25,47].
The preventive immunization of laboratory workers
(see for instance the Special Immunization Program in
the US [51]) is another option not considered in this
work. Although for diseases for which a vaccine is avail-
able this is a measure to take into account (for instance,
the incidence of hepatitis B virus (HBV) infection among
laboratory workers in the UK has significantly dropped
because of the availability of immunization [52]), this
measure is highly questionable for genetically modified
influenza viruses, not to speak of influenza viruses for
which no vaccine is currently available, for example,
A(H7N9).
In summary, our results suggest that public health
authorities should be prepared to put in place a set of
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cing and closure of schools and workplaces on a geo-
graphical basis. Moreover, as it is nearly impossible to
get accurate estimates of R0 (as well as case fatality rate)
for a new virus at the very beginning of the outbreak, in
order to maximally reduce the risk of a global pandemic
the possibility of timely targeting a large fraction of the
population with antivirals (as a prophylactic measure on
a geographical basis) or establishing quarantine areas
should not be set aside, even though this calls for the de-
velopment of detailed intervention plans and requires
public health agencies to put in place containment efforts
hardly achievable in most places in the world. Where the
pandemic pathogens are concerned, short generation time
and asymptomaticity are among the most critical factors
that make accidental release of influenza viruses difficult
to contain.
Qualitatively, the results do not vary much by consid-
ering different seeding locations. However, containment
probabilities are affected by several factors, including po-
pulation density and sociodemographic structure. These
findings may have an important impact on policies: our
results strongly suggest the location of new BSL facilities
worldwide should be carefully chosen, for instance with
priority given to rural areas and, when this is not fea-
sible, by taking into account density and structure of
the population in urban areas. This may make the
difference, especially for pathogens with low to mode-
rate transmissibility. Of course, these decisions should
also be based on other factors not considered in this
study, for example, population vulnerability to infec-
tious agents, risk factors, structure of the health sys-
tem, possibility of putting in place a rapid response
program. Simulated scenarios emerging from detailed
models such as the one presented here may inform
quantitatively the process of identifying locations that
minimize risk. Finally, it is worth remarking that the
presented approach can be generally extended to other
pathogens that can be classified as dual use research of
concern if we have the appropriate information on the
pathogens, mechanism of transmission and natural history
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